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Abstract
In this paper we propose a two-stage protocol for re-
source management in a hierarchically organized cloud.
The first stage exploits spatial locality for the formation
of coalitions of supply agents; the second stage, a com-
binatorial auction, is based on a modified proxy-based
clock algorithm and has two phases, a clock phase and a
proxy phase. The clock phase supports price discovery;
in the second phase a proxy conducts multiple rounds of
a combinatorial auction for the package of services re-
quested by each client. The protocol strikes a balance
between low-cost services for cloud clients and a decent
profit for the service providers. We also report the re-
sults of an empirical investigation of the combinatorial
auction stage of the protocol.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Nowadays large farms of computing and storage servers
are assembled to support several cloud delivery models
including Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a
Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).
In such systems users pay only for computing resources
they use, similarly to other utilities such as electricity
and water.
Computer clouds raise the question of how far we can
push the limits of composability of computing and com-
munication systems, while still being able to support
effective policies for resource management and their im-
plementation mechanisms. The software, the glue al-
lowing us to build increasingly more complex systems,
consists of more and more layers thus, the challenge of
controlling large-scale systems is amplified.
Control theory tells us that accurate state informa-
tion and a tight feedback loop are the critical elements
for effective control of a system. In a hierarchical or-
ganization the quality of state information degrades as
we move from the bottom to the top; only local infor-
mation about the state of a server is by definition accu-
rate. Moreover, this information is volatile, it must be
acted upon promptly because the state changes rapidly.
Our recent results [22] confirm that hierarchical control
has considerably larger overhead than a simple economic
model for cloud resource management. The communi-
cation complexity of hierarchical control based on moni-
toring is more than two orders of magnitude higher and
consumes a significant fraction of the available band-
width at all levels of the interconnection network.
Existing solutions for cloud resource management are
neither effective nor scalable and they require detailed
models of the system and accurate information about
the state of individual servers. The polices for cloud re-
source management must support: (i) admission control;
(ii) capacity allocation; (iii) load balancing; (iv) energy
optimization, and (v) quality of service (QoS) [21]. Some
of the existing and future challenges for cloud resource
management which affect these policies are:
-1. The cloud infrastructure is increasingly more hetero-
geneous; servers with different configurations of multi-
core processors, GPUs, FPGAs, and data flow engines
are expected to become elements of the cloud computing
landscape.
-2. The spectrum of cloud services and cloud applica-
tions widens. For example, AWS added new services,
including Elastic Cache, and Dynamo DB, offers several
types of EC2 (Elastic Cloud Computing) profiles includ-
ing C3 - compute optimized, R3 - memory optimized;
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each instance type provides different sets of computer
resources measured by vCPUs (vCPU is a hyper-thread
of an Intel Xeon core for M3, C3, R3, HS1, G2, and I2).
This process is expected to continue at a faster pace to
accommodate the so-called Big Data applications.
-3. Cloud over-provisioning demands high initial costs
and leads to a low system utilization; this strategy is
not economically sustainable [10]. Elasticity allows cloud
users to increase or decrease their resource consumption
based on their needs; elasticity is now based on over-
provisioning, assembling pools of resources far larger
than required to satisfy the average needs. As a re-
sult the average cloud server utilization is in the 18% to
30% range [4, 5]. Power consumption of clouds based on
over-provisioning is excessive and has a negative ecolog-
ical impact [4, 26]. A 2010 survey [6] reports that idle
or under utilized servers contribute 11 million tonnes of
unnecessary CO2 emissions each year and that the total
yearly cost for the idle servers is $19 billion.
-4. The cloud computing landscape is fragmented. CSPs
support different cloud delivery models. and this leads
to the vendor lock-in; once becoming familiar and stor-
ing her data on one cloud it is very costly for the user
to migrate to another CSP.
In a large scale-system tensions between local and
global objectives exist. These tensions manifest them-
selves in questions such as: How to balance the individ-
ual cost of autonomous servers with global goals e.g.,
maximizing the CSP payoff? How to adapt the price
for services to the actual demand? How to find an
equilibrium between system reconfiguration and contin-
uous system availability? Moreover, cooperation must
reflect the particular characteristics of the physical or-
ganization. Locality is important; indeed, communica-
tion across multiple layers of the networking infrastruc-
ture is less desirable as the latency increases and the
bandwidth decreases. The hypothesis of our research
is that self-organization and self-management could ad-
dress these challenges and provide effective means for
cloud resource management.
Informally, self-organization means synergetic activ-
ities of elements when no single element acts as a co-
ordinator and the global patterns of behavior are dis-
tributed. Self-management means that individuals can
effectively set their own goals, make decisions on how
to achieve those goals, plan and schedule their activities
independently, and evaluate the progress towards these
goals. Self-management can lead to faster and more ac-
curate resource management decisions.
Self-management as a result of auctions eliminates the
need for a system model and requires only local thus,
more accurate information about the state of individ-
ual components. This approach has the potential of
optimizing the use of resources and allow Cloud Ser-
vice Providers (CSPs) to offer services at a lower cost
for the consumers [13, 19]. Though the virtues of self-
management have long been recognized, there is, to our
knowledge, no cloud computing infrastructure, based on
self-organizing principles and self-management. This is
in itself proof of the difficulties to apply these concepts
in practice.
Self-management has to be coupled with some mech-
anisms for coalition formation allowing autonomous
agents, the servers, to act in concert. Autonomous sys-
tems have to cooperate to guarantee QoS by distribut-
ing and balancing the workload, replicate services to
increase reliability, and implement other global system
policies. Cooperation means that individual systems
have to partially surrender their autonomy.
Self-organization cannot occur instantaneously in an
adaptive system. It is critical to give the autonomous
cloud platforms interconnected by a hierarchy of net-
works the time to form coalitions in response to ser-
vices requests thus, self-management requires an effec-
tive reservation system. Reservations are ubiquitous for
systems offering services to a large customer population,
e.g., airline ticketing, chains of hotels, and so on. Ex-
isting clouds, e.g., the Amazon Web Services, offer both
reservations and spot access, with spot access rates lower
than those for reservations.
The solution discussed in this paper involves concepts,
policies, and algorithms from several well-established ar-
eas of economics and computer science: self-organization
and self-management of complex systems; coalition for-
mation and virtual organizations; auction theory and
practice; and system organization and computer archi-
tecture. We discuss related work and our contributions
in Section 2 and in Section 3 we describe the system
model. Algorithms for the formation of sub-coalitions
and for clock-proxy auction are the subjects of Sections
4 and 5, respectively. The results of a simulation exper-
iment and the conclusions of our work are presented in
Sections 6 and 7.
2 Related Work
The present and future challenges outlined in Section
1 motivate the search for effective and scalable policies
and mechanisms for cloud resource management [7, 9,
18, 23, 25, 29, 36]. In this section we survey some of the
research in this area focused on market mechanisms.
Coalition formation. Informally, a coalition is a
group of entities which have agreed to cooperate for
achieving a common goal. A virtual organization in-
volves entities that require a communication infrastruc-
ture and dedicated software to support their activities.
Coalition formation is a widely used method for increas-
ing the efficiency of resource utilization and for providing
convenient means to access these resources [24]. In re-
cent years, the emergence of large-scale electronic mar-
kets, grid and cloud computing, sensor networks, and
robotics have amplified the interest in coalition forma-
tion and virtual organizations [16, 17, 31]. For example,
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self-organization of sensor networks through bottom-up
coalition formation is discussed in [20, 32].
Different aspects of resource management in compu-
tational grids including load balancing, job-allocation,
and scheduling, as well as revenue sharing when agents
form coalitions or virtual organizations are discussed in
[8, 14, 15, 27, 33, 35]. Grid resource allocation is mod-
eled as cooperative games [15] or non-cooperative games
[27]. Resource co-allocation is presented in [35].
There is little surprise that the interest in coalition
formation migrated in recent years from computational
grids to cloud resource management. The vast majority
of on-going research in this area is focused on game-
theoretic aspects of coalition formation for cloud federa-
tions. A cloud federation is of a set of CSPs collaborating
to provide services to a cloud user community.
A stochastic linear programing game model for coali-
tion formation is presented in [25]; the authors analyze
the stability of the coalition formation among cloud ser-
vice providers and show that resource and revenue shar-
ing are deeply intertwined. An optimal VM provisioning
algorithm ensuring profit maximization for CSPs is in-
troduced in [9].
A cloud federation formation described as a hedonic
game and focused on the stability and the fairness of the
game is discussed in [23]. The profit maximization for
each federation is formulated as an integer programming
problem (IP) and the game is augmented with a pref-
erence relation over the set of federations. The paper
assumes that the Virtual Machines (VMs) contributed
by each CSP to a federation are characterized by sev-
eral attributes, a ∈ A including the number of cores,
the amount of memory and of secondary storage. The
IP problem for CSP Ci in federation F is formulated as
max
∑
Ci∈F
∑n
j=1 ni,j(pj− ci,j) subject to the set of con-
ditions
∑n
j=1 q
a
jni,j ≤ Ai, ∀a ∈ A and
∑
Ci∈F ni,j = rj
with: ni,j - the number of VMs of type j; pj - the price
for a VM running an instance of type j; ci,j - the cost of
an instance of type j provided by Ci; qaj - the quantity
of resource of type a in a VM of type j; Ai - the total
amount of resource of type a offered by Ci; and rj - the
number of VMs of type j requested. The paper adopts
a payoff division based on the Banzhaf value [23].
A combinatorial coalition formation problem is de-
scribed in [17]. The paper assumes that a seller has a
price schedule for each item. The larger the quantity re-
quested, the lower is the price a buyer has to pay for each
item; thus, buyers can take advantage of price discounts
by forming coalitions. A similar assumption is adopted
by the authors of [16] who investigate systems where
the negotiations among deliberate agents are not feasi-
ble due to the scale of the system. The paper proposes a
macroscopic model and derives a set of differential equa-
tions describing the evolution in time of coalitions with a
different number of participants. The results show that
even a low rate of leaving away participants allows a
coalition to achieve a steady state.
An algorithm to find optimal coalition structures in
cooperative games by searching through a lattice like
the one in Figure 2, was introduced by [30]. A more
refined algorithm is described in [28]; in this algorithm
the coalition structures are grouped according to the so-
called configurations reflecting the size of the coalitions.
Auctions. Auctions are a widely used mechanism for
resource allocation [11, 12]. Among the numerous appli-
cations of auctions are: the auctioning of airport take-
off and landing slots, spectrum licensing by the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC), and industrial pro-
curement. An online auction mechanism for resource
allocation in computer clouds is presented in [35].
A combinatorial auction is one where a buyer requires
simultaneous access to a package of goods. An auction
allows the seller to obtain the maximum feasible profit
for the auctioned goods; it is organized by an auctioneer
for every request of a consumer. A proxy is an inter-
mediary who collects individual bids from the buyers
participating at an auction, computes the total cost of
the package from the bids, and communicates this price
to the auctioneer. A vast literature including [1, 2, 3, 34]
covers multiple aspects of combinatorial auctions includ-
ing bidding incentives, stability, equilibrium, algorithm
testing, and algorithm optimality.
Package bidding assumes that a seller offers N differ-
ent types of items. A buyer bids for packages of items.
A package is a vector of integers Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zN }
which indicates the quantity of each item in the package;
the price of items is given by M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mN }.
Package bidding can be traced back to generalized
Vickerey auctions based on the Vickerey-Clarke-Groves
mechanisms [11, 12]. In Vickerey auctions a bidder re-
ports its entire demand schedule. The auctioneer then
selects the allocation which maximizes the total value
of the package and requires a bidder to pay the lowest
bid it would have made to win its portion of the final
allocation, considering all other bids.
In an ascending package auction (APA) there are K
participants identified by an index, k = 0 is the seller
and k = 1, 2, . . . ,K are the buyers [1]. Each buyer has
a valuation vector vi = (νi(z), z ∈ [0,M]); νk(z) repre-
sents the value of package z to the bidder k. Some of
the rules for this type of auction are: all bids are firm,
a bid cannot be reduced or withdrawn; the auctioneer
identifies after each round the set of the bids that max-
imize the total price, the so-called provisional winning
bids. The auction ends when a new round fails to elicit
new bids; then the provisional winning bids become the
winers of the auction.
In an ascending package auction a bidder can be de-
terred from bidding for the package she really desires by
the threat that competitors could drive prices up; this
would threaten the equilibrium. This problem does not
exist in ascending proxy auctions when each bidder in-
structs a proxy agent to bid on her behalf [1]. The proxy
accepts as input the bidder’s valuation profile and bids
following a “sincere strategy.” Nash equilibrium can be
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reached when the bid increments are negligibly small [1].
In a clock auction the auctioneer announces prices and
the bidders indicate the quantities they wish to buy at
the current price. When the demand for an item in-
creases, so does its price until the there is no excess de-
mand. On the other hand, when the offering exceeds the
demand, the price decreases [1]. In a clock auction the
bidding agents see only aggregate information, the price
at a given time, and this eliminates collusive strategies
and interactions among bidding agents. The auction is
monotonic, the amounts auctioned decrease continually
and this guarantees that the auction eventually termi-
nates. When the price of a package can be computed as
the sum of products of prices and quantities it is said
that auction benefits from linear pricing.
The clock-proxy-auction is a hybrid auction based on
an iterative process with two phases [3]. A clock phase
is followed by a proxy round. During the proxy round
the bidders report the values they have submitted to
the proxy which in turn submit bids for the package
to the auctioneer. A bidder has a single opportunity
to report the quantity and the price to the proxy, bid
withdrawals are not allowed, and the bids are mutually
exclusive. The auctioneer then selects the winning bids
that maximize the seller’s profit.
The contribution of this paper. The reservation
system we propose has two stages; coalitions of servers
are formed periodically during the first and in the sec-
ond the coalitions participate in combinatorial auctions
organized in each allocation slot. To our knowledge this
is the first attempt to address cloud self-organization
and resource management based on coalition forma-
tion and combinatorial auctions when individual servers
learn from past behavior, see Figure 1.
Coalition formation Combinatorial auctions
Requests for service
Coalition values from previous auctions
Successful 
bids
Figure 1: A protocol with two stages; feedback about
past values of individual coalitions is used to determine
the value of individual coalition structures as shown in
Section 4.
We discuss coalition formation for a realistic model of
the cloud infrastructure, hierarchical organization, while
most of the research reported in the literature is focused
on coalition formation for cloud federations. The coali-
tion formation problem has different formulations and
different constraints in the two cases.
At this time individual CSPs believe that they have a
competitive advantage due to the unique value of their
services and are not motivated to disclose relevant infor-
mation about the inner working of their systems as we
have re-discovered when investigating the energy con-
sumption of AWS instances [26]. Thus, the practical
realization of cloud federations seems a rather remote
possibility [21].
A rare glimpse at the architecture of a cloud is pro-
vided in [5] and we are taking advantage of it to base
our research on a realistic model of the cloud infrastruc-
ture. We investigate coalition formation subject to the
physical constraints of the hierarchical cloud organiza-
tion model. As more diverse applications, including Big
Data applications, are likely to use computer clouds, the
demand for computing resources allocated to a single ap-
plication will increase and could be considerably larger
than any server can provide; only coalitions of servers
will be capable to offer such resources. It is critical for
the members of a coalition to communicate effectively;
this requires coalition member to be in close proximity
of each other in a system consisting of a hierarchy of net-
works with different bandwidth and latency. This adds
additional constrains to the coalition formation protocol.
To respond to the needs of increasingly more com-
plex applications consisting of multiple phases and re-
quiring workflow management, CSPs are already offer-
ing workflow management services such as SWS (Simple
Workflow Management) and EBS (Elastic Bean Stock)
at AWS. Different phases of an application may require
coalitions of servers with different types of resources and
this is the reason why we decided to investigate combina-
torial auctions where packages of items are auctioned.
3 System Model
System architecture. We assume a hierarchical orga-
nization of the cloud infrastructure similar to the one
described in [5]. A data center consists of multiple
warehouse-scale computers (WSCs), each WSC has mul-
tiple cells, each cell has multiple racks and each rack
houses multiple servers. A WSC connects 50, 000 to
100, 000 servers and uses a hierarchy of networks. The
servers are housed in racks; typically, the 48 servers in a
rack are connected by a 48 port Gigabit Ethernet switch.
The switch has two to eight up-links which go to higher
level switches in the network hierarchy [5]. The band-
width to communicate outside the rack is much smaller
than the one within the rack; this has important impli-
cations for resource management policies and becomes
increasingly difficult to address in systems with a large
number of servers.
Model assumptions. For simplicity we assume that
the racks are homogeneous, they have identical proces-
sors with the same number of cores and an identical con-
figuration of GPUs, FPGAs, workflow engines, or other
hardware, the same amount of main storage, cache, and
secondary storage. We also assume that all servers in
a rack are identically configured and support the same
type of services. The same service may be offered by
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multiple racks; for example, multiple racks could offer
configurations with GPUs.
The system we envision supports a reservation system
and spot resource allocation. The reservation system has
two stages: (A) coalition formation, and (B) combina-
torial auctions. The spot allocation is done through a
bidding process for each type of service. The time is
quantified, reservations are made as a result of auctions
carried out at the beginning of each allocation slot of
duration τ ; for example, a allocation slot could be one
hour.
Coalition formation. The rational for coalition for-
mation is that applications may need resources beyond
those provided by an individual server. For example, a
Map-Reduce application may require a set of 20 servers
during the Map phase to process a data set of several
PB (Petabytes). If the algorithm requires the servers
to communicate during this phase then the application
should start at the same time on all servers and run at
the same pace, a condition known as co-scheduling. Co-
scheduling is only feasible if the set of 20 servers form
a coalition dedicated to the application; moreover, the
hardware configuration of the coalition members should
be optimal for the algorithms used by the application,
e.g., have attached GPUs.
Combinatorial auctions. Combinatorial auctions
allow cloud users making the reservations to acquire
packages consisting of coalitions of servers with different
types and amounts of resources. Combinatorial auctions
are necessary because different phases of an application
may require systems with different configurations or sys-
tems supporting different functions. In our previous ex-
ample the Reduce phase of the Map-Reduce application
may require several servers with a very large amount of
secondary storage.
4 Coalition Formation
First, we discuss the formulation of the coalition for-
mation problem as a cooperative game. Then we intro-
duce the algorithms for determining the optimal coali-
tion structure and for coalition formation in the context
of our model.
Coalition formation as a cooperative game. The
coalition formation is modeled as a cooperative game
where the goal of all agents is to maximize the reward
due to the entire set of agents. We consider a set of N
servers {s1, s2, . . . , sN}, located in the same rack.
A coalition Ci is a non-empty subset of N . A coalition
structure is set of m coalitions S = {C1,C2, . . . ,Cm}
satisfying the following conditions
m⋃
i=1
| Ci |= N and i 6= j ⇒ Ci
⋂
Cj = ∅. (1)
Figure 2 shows a lattice representation of the coali-
tion structures for a set of four servers s1, s2, s3 and s4.
This lattice has four levels, L1, L2, L3 and L4 contain-
ing the coalition structures with 1, 2, 3 and 4 coalitions,
respectively. In general, the level k of a lattice contains
all coalition structures with k coalitions; the number of
of coalitions structures at level k for a population of N
agents is given by the Sterling Number of Second Kind:
S(N, k) = 1
k!
k∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
k
i
)
(k − i)N . (2)
In the case illustrated in Figure 2 N = 4 and the number
of coalition structures at levels L1 − L4 are 1, 7, 6, 1,
respectively.1 The total number of coalition structures
with N agents is called the Bell number
B(N) =
N∑
k=0
S(N, k) =
N∑
k=0
1
k!
k∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
k
i
)
(k − i)N .
(3)
The number of coalitions structures increases exponen-
tially with the number of agents. For example, for N =
40, a typical number of servers in a rack, the logarithm
of the number of coalition structures is close to 1035 and
S(40, 14) = 3.5859872255621803491428554E + 34. The
logarithm of number of coalitions is close to E + 10.
Searching for the optimal coalition structure C is com-
putationally challenging due to the size of the search
space. The first step for determining the optimal coali-
tion structure is to assign a value v reflecting the utility
of each coalition. The second step is the actual coalition
formation.
Rack-level coalition formation. Recall from Sec-
tion 3 that in our model a rack is homogeneous, all
servers have an identical configuration. This realistic as-
sumption simplifies considerably the complexity of the
search for an optimal coalition structure as the servers
are indistinguishable from one another.
The second important observation is that we have
a system with two stages and feedback, see Figure 1.
In the second stage the coalitions created during the
first stage are included in successfully auctioned pack-
ages thus, we can determine precisely the value of all
coalitions structures. The third important observation
is that only available servers, servers with no commit-
ments for the current slot, can participate to coalition
formations and then to the auction organized in that
slot; call Na ≤ N the number of available servers.
An elected rack leader collects information about all
successful coalitions - coalitions that have been included
in packages auctioned successfully during a window of w
successive past allocation slots. The current rack-leader
records an entry for the corresponding partial coalition
1For N = 5 and N = 6 the Stirling Numbers of the Second
Kind are respectively 1, 15, 25, 10, 1 and 1, 31, 90, 65, 15, 1.
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{s1}{s2}{s3}{s4}
{s1}{s2}{s3,s4} {s1}{s3}{s2,s4} {s1}{s4}{s2,s3} {s2}{s3}{s1,s4} {s2}{s4}{s1,s3} {s3}{s4}{s1,s2}
{s1}{s2,s3,s4} {s2}{s1,s3,s4} {s3}{s1,s2,s4} {s4}{s1,s2,s3} {s1,s4}{s2,s3} {s1,s2}{s3,s4} {s1,s3}{s2,s4}
{s1,s2,s3,s4}
L4
L3
L2
L1
Figure 2: A lattice with four levels L1, L2, L3 and L4 shows the coalition structures for a set of 4 servers, s1, s2, s3
and s4. The number of coalitions in a coalition structure at level Lk is equal to k.
structure (PCS) including nk - the coalition size, mk -
the multiplicity of occurrence, the value v¯k calculated as
the average price over all auctions when a PCS including
a coalition of size nk was part of a package successfully
auctioned during the past w allocation slots.
Call L the PCL-list. For a window of size w the list
L is the list of all triplets Lk = [nk,mk, v¯k] ordered first
by 1 ≤ nk ≤ Na then by mk. The list includes only
entries Lk with v¯k > 0. Given Na a coalition structure
(CS) Sk among the entries Lk1,Lk2, ... . . . ,Lkn is feasi-
ble if
∑
j nk ×mk = Na. Then the value of the coalition
structure Sk is vk =
∑
j v¯j . Note that we force the for-
mation of coalitions involving all available servers. An
example of a PCS list L follows
----------------------------------------------
a [1,4,35] \* 4 PCS of 1-server {s}
b [1,15,682] \ *15 PCS of 1-server {s}
.........
c [2,3,78] \* 3 PCS of 2-servers {s,s}
........
d [3,2,502] \* 2 PCS of 3-servers {s,s,s}
e [3,4,812] \* 4 PCS of 3-servers {s,s,s}
.........
f [16,1,751] \* 1 PCS of 16-servers {s,...s}
g [16,2,740] \* 2 PCS of 16-servers {s,...s}
.........
-----------------------------------------------
In this example some of the feasible coalitions struc-
tures when Na = 16 are: Sg with vg = 751; Sa,b with
va,b = 35 + 682 = 712; Sa,e with va,e = 35 + 812 = 837;
Sa,c,d with va,c,d = 35 + 78 + 502 = 615, and so on. Note
that the value of a coalition reflects also the length of
time the coalition was active in response to successful
auction. We see that a PCS of 15 coalitions of 1 server
have been active for larger number of slots than a PCS
of 4 coalitions of 1 server. The value attributed to a
coalition of k servers is a distributed equally among the
servers; the value of a package of several coalitions auc-
tioned successfully is divided among the coalitions based
on the resource supplied by each one of them.
Coalition formation. The protocol for coalition for-
mation proceeds as follows:
1. Server si sends to the current rack leader:
(a) A vector ([ν1i , β
1
i ], [ν
2
i , β
2
i ], . . . ....[ν
N
i , β
N
i ]) with
νki , 1 ≤ k ≤ N the total value due to the par-
ticipation of si in successful coalitions, of k
servers and βki a bit vector with w components
with βk,ji = 1 if si was included in a successful
coalition of k servers in slot j of window w.
(b) Availability, ai = 1 if available, 0 otherwise.
2. After receiving the information from all servers the
current rack leader:
(a) Determines Na =
∑N
i=1 ai.
(b) Computes mk =
∑Na
i=1
∑w
j=1 β
k,j
i , 1 ≤ k ≤ N .
(c) Computes v¯k =
∑
νki
(d) Computes the optimal coalition structure.
(e) Assigns a server to coalition of size k a based
on the values νki .
(f) Chooses the best performer as the next coali-
tion leader. The best performer is the one with
the largest value
∑
j ν
j
i .
Finding the optimal CS requires at most L operations
with L the size of the PCL-list. The system starts with a
predetermined coalition structure and coalition values.
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5 A Reservation System Based on a
Combinatorial Auction Protocol
The protocol introduced in this section targets primar-
ily the IaaS cloud delivery model represented by Amazon
Web Services (AWS). Reservation systems are currently
used by CSPs. For example, AWS supports reserva-
tions as well as spot allocation and offers a limited num-
ber of instance families, including M3 (general purpose),
C3 (compute optimized), R3 (memory optimized), I2
(storage optimized), G2 (GPU) and so on. An in-
stance is a package of system resources; for example,
the c3.8xlarge instance provides 32 vCPU, 60 GiB of
memory, and 2× 320 GB of SSD storage. The resources
auctioned are supplied by coalitions of servers in differ-
ent racks and the cloud users request packages of re-
sources.
The combinatorial auction protocol is inspired by the
clock-proxy auction [3]. The clock-proxy auction has a
clock phase, where the price discovery takes place, and a
proxy phase, when bids for packages are entertained. In
the original clock-proxy auction there is one seller and
multiple buyers who bid for packages of goods.
For example, the airways spectrum in the US is auc-
tioned by the FCC and communication companies bid
for licenses. A package consist of multiple licenses; the
quantities in these auctions are the bandwidth allocated
times the population covered by the license. Individ-
ual bidders choose to bid for packages during the proxy
phase and pay the prices they committed to during the
clock phase.
Our protocol supports auctioning service packages; a
packages consist of combinations of services in one or
more time slots. The items sold are services advertised
by coalitions of autonomous servers and the bidders are
the cloud users. Each service is characterized by
1. A type describing the resources offered and the con-
ditions for service,
2. The time slots when the service is available.
Protocol specification. The terms used to describe
the protocol are discussed next. An allocation slot (AS)
is a period of fixed duration, e.g., one hour, that can be
auctioned. An auction, At, is organized at time t if there
are pending reservation requests which require immedi-
ate attention. Figure 3 shows two consecutive auctions
at times t and s; during the first slot of auction At new
reservation requests are received and the allocation slot
ASt2 is not fully covered; this slot becomes AS
s
1 for As.
A service A is described by a relatively small number
of attributes, {a1, a2, . . . , }. Each attribute ai can take a
number of distinct values, vi = {vi,1, vi,2, . . .}. The first
attribute is the coalition size or equivalently the number
of vCPS provided; other attributes could be the type of
service and server architecture with two values “32-bit”
and “64-bit;” another attribute could be “organization”
with values “vN” (von Neumann), “DF” (data-flow), or
“vN-GPU” (vN with graphics co-processor).
Call St the set of services the clients want to reserve
during auction At
St = {St1, St2, . . . , Stνt} with Sti = [sId, (aj , vj,k)] (4)
A reservation bundle, αti,j ⊂ St, is the set of services
requested by client i in slot j of auction At
αti,j = {(Sti,j,1, rti,j,1), (Sti,j,2, rti,j,2), . . .} (5)
with rti,j,l a measure of the quantity; for example, if the
attribute is “service intensity” the quantity is the num-
ber of vCPUs.
An advertised bundle, βtk,j ⊂ St, is the set of services
advertised by coalition k in slot j of auction At
βtk,j = {(Stk,j,1, qtk,j,1, ptk,1), (Stk,j,2, qtk,j,2, pk,2) . . .} (6)
with qtk,j,l a measure of the quantity of service l and pk,l
the price per ECU of service Stl determined by coalition
k. A package, Pti is a set of reservations for services
requested by client i for slots j1, j2, . . . during auction
At.
Pti = {αti,j1 , αti,j2 , . . .} (7)
The clock phase. Figure 4 illustrates the basic idea
of a clock phase: the auctioneer announces prices and
the bidders indicate the quantities they wish to buy at
the current price. When the demand for an item in-
creases, so does its price until there is no excess demand;
on the other hand, when the offering exceeds the de-
mand, the price decreases.
During the clock phase of auction At the price discov-
ery is done for each time slot and for each type of service;
a clock runs for each one of the κt slots and for each one
of the νt services. Next we describe the clock phase for
service Stl in slot j. Assume that there are n coalitions
C = {C1,C2, . . . ,Cn} offering the service and m requests
for reservations from clients D = {D1,D2, . . . ,Dm}.
A clock auction starts at clock time t = 0 and at price
per unit of service for Sl
p0l = minCk
{pk,l} (8)
Call C0 the available capacity at this price and D0 the
demand for service Stl offered at price p
0
l in slot j
C0 =
n∑
k=1
qtk,j,l and D0 =
m∑
i=1
rti,j,l. (9)
If C0 < D0 the clock c advances and the next price per
unit of service is
p1l = p
0
l + I (10)
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Figure 3: Auctions At and As conducted at times t and s, respectively. τ t0 and τ s0 are the start of the first allocation
slots, ASt1 and AS
s
1 of the two auctions. The number of slots auctioned in each case are κ
t and κs, respectively.
with I the price increment decided at the beginning of
auction. There is an ample discussion in the literature
regarding the size of the price increment; if too small,
the duration of the clock phase increases, if too large, it
introduces incentives for gaming [3].
The process is repeated at the next clock value start-
ing with the new price. The clock phase for service Stl
and slot j terminates when there is no more demand.
Auctioneer
C1
C2
Cn
q
t
2,j,l
pc+ I
D1
D2
Dm
q
t
1,j,l
q
t
n,jl
r
t
1,j,l
r
t
2,j,l
r
t
m,j,l
r
t
i,j,lΣ Σ qtk,j,l>
c
Figure 4: The clock phase for service Stl and slot j. The
starting price is p0l given by Equation 8. The clock ad-
vances and the price increases from pc to pc + I when
the available capacity at that price given by Equation 9
is exhausted; the demand is given by Equation 9.
The proxy phase. In a traditional clock-proxy auc-
tion the bidders do not bid directly, they report to a
proxy the price and the quantity of each item in the
package they desire. The proxy then bids in an ascend-
ing package auction.
In our application, the proxy phase of the auction con-
sists of multiple rounds. The auction favors bids for long
runs of consecutive slots when the service is provided by
the same coalition. This strategy is designed to exploit
temporal and spatial locality.
The auction starts with the longest runs and the low-
est price per slot and proceeds with increasingly shorter
runs and diminished incentives. Once a run of consec-
utive slots is the subject of a provisional winning bid,
all shorter runs of slots for that particular service are
removed from the coalition offerings.
During the first round only the longest run of consec-
utive slots for each one of the services offered by the par-
ticipating coalitions is auctioned and only bidders that
have committed to any of the slots of the run are allowed
to bid. The price per slot for the entire run is the lowest
price for any slot of the run the bidder has committed to
during the clock phase of the auction. If there are multi-
ple bids for service Stl the provisional winner is the one
providing the largest revenue for the coalition offering
the service.
If κtl is the longest run of consecutive slots for service
Stl auctioned in the first round then, in the second round,
a shorter run of κtl − 1 slots is auctioned. The price for
the entire run equals the second lowest price for any slot
of the run the bidder has committed to during the clock
phase of the auction times the number of the time slots
in the run.
The length of the consecutive slot runs auctioned de-
creases and the incentives diminish after each round.
The preliminary rounds end with the auction of a sin-
gle slot for each service. At the end of the preliminary
round each bidder is required to offer the price for the
slot committed to during the clock phase. Figure 5 de-
picts a plausible snapshot at the end of the preliminary
rounds of the proxy phase when four services S1,S2,S3
and S4, are offered and shows the provisional winners
for service S4.
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Allocation slots
Service S1
Service S2
Service S3
Service S4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 13 1412 15 16 17 18
Auction time
C9 C13
C6 C1 C11
C7 C9
Figure 5: A snapshot at the end of the preliminary rounds of the proxy phase when there are four services offered
and the auction covers 18 allocation slots. Dotted lines represent the quantity of service with provisional winners.
Only the provisional winers for S4 are shown, the clients labeled as C9, C13, C6, C1, C11, C7 and C9.
During the final round the bidders reveal the packages
they want to reserve; these packages include only the
provisional winners from the preliminary slots. Once
all provisional winning bids for services in a reservation
request are known, the auctioneer chooses the package
that best matches the consumer’s needs and, at the same
time maximizes the profit for the cloud service provider.
The coalition for a reservation request consists of the
set of coalitions that provide the services in the winning
package.
In this auction all bids are firm, they cannot be with-
drawn. The auction is monotonic, the length of runs of
consecutive slots auctioned decreases continually; this
guarantees that the auction eventually terminates. Lin-
ear pricing guarantees that the price of any package can
be computed with ease.
The effectiveness of the protocol is captured by
several metrics including:
-1. The customer satisfaction index - percentage of reser-
vation requests fully or partially satisfied in each alloca-
tion slot given the total number of requests.
-2. The service mismatch index - percentage of services
requested but not offered in each allocation slot given
the total number of services in that slot.
-3. The service success index - percentage of services
used in each allocation slot given all services offered in
that slot.
-4. The capacity allocation index - percentage of the
capacity offered but not auctioned in each allocation slot
given the capacity offered in that slot.
-5. The overbidding factor - percentage of slots with a
provisional winner that have not been included in any
package given all slots offered at the beginning of the
auction.
-6. The temporal fragmentation index - percentage of
services successfully auctioned in non-consecutive slots
given all services successfully auctioned.
-7. The additional profit index - percentage of additional
profit of coalitions involved in the auction (the differ-
ence of the actual price obtained at the auction and the
price demanded by the coalition) relative to the price
demanded by the coalition.
Limitations and vulnerabilities. The protocol is
fairly complex and has at least one vulnerability. A bid-
der may be the provisional winner of services in slots
not included in its winning package; such services will
remain unassigned during the current auction. A solu-
tion is to penalizeexcess bidding activity and charge the
bidder a percentage of the costs for these services. An-
other alternative is to include, in a reservation request,
a set of “substitute services” for a service Si. Then,
during the last round of the proxy phase, the auctioneer
could try to match services having provisional winners
with unsatisfied requests for services.
The capacity offered, but not auctioned in each slot
is available for spot allocation thus, it has the potential
to be used, rather then being wasted. The capacity of
a coalition left uncommitted at the end of the auction
At for ASt1, the first slot of the auction, is then available
for spot allocation at a price equal to pk,l, while the free
capacity in slots starting with ASt2 can be offered at
the next auction if this auction takes place before the
beginning of the slot. This capacity is measured by the
spot allocation opportunity index.
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6 Protocol Analysis and Evaluation
We report on the results of our simulation experiments
to gain some insight into the proxy phase of the clock-
proxy auction of the PC2P protocol. The system we
wish to evaluate requires the description of the environ-
ment in which the auction takes place, the reservation
requests, and the services offered:
1. The environment elements: n - the number of coali-
tions offering services in this round; m - the number
of clients; and κ - the number of slots auctioned.
2. The package j requested by client i: αni - the num-
ber of services in the package; the slots desired by
the service Sk, ordered by the length of the run of
consecutive slots; rk,j - the intensity of service Sk in
slot j; pi,j - the price per unit of service for slot j if
client i was a provisional winner of that slot during
the clock phase.
3. The service Sk provided by coalition Ck includes: γk
- the largest run of consecutive slots for each offered
service Sk; the profile of the service Sk - the slots
offered ordered by the length of consecutive slots,
when it is available; qk,j - the quantity of service
Sk offered in slot j; and pk - the price per unit of
service offered by coalition Ck.
For simplicity, we assume that a coalition offers one
service only and the number of services is ν < n. We
also assume that all platforms have a maximum capac-
ity of 100 vCPUs and that qk,j , the quantity of service
Sk offered for auction, and rk,j , the quantity of Sk re-
quested in slot j are the same for all the slots of an
offered/requested run. The number of slots auctioned is
fixed, κ = 50.
The range and the distribution of parameters for the
protocol evaluation are chosen to represent typical cases.
The parameters of the simulation are random variables
with a uniform distribution:
-a. The number of coalitions and clients requesting reser-
vations, n and m, respectively; the interval is [200−250].
-b. The number of services offered and requested ν; the
interval is [10− 20].
-c. The number of clients bidding for each service in a
given slot; the interval is [0− 4].
-d. The capacity offered for auction for a service in a
given slot; the interval is [60− 90] vCPUs.
-e. The services offered by a coalition; the interval is
[1− ν].
-f. The number of consecutive slots a service is offered
in; the interval is [1− κ].
-g. The number of services in the package requested by
a client; the interval is [1− 3].
-f. The number of consecutive slots of the services in the
package requested by a client; the interval is [1− κ].
We also randomly choose the slots when the client is
the provisional winner. The evaluation process consists
of the following steps:
A. Initialization.
B. Preliminary rounds. Carry out γ preliminary rounds
with γ = maxk γk.
• In the first preliminary round auction auction κ1
slots of service S1, κ2 slots of service S2, and so on.
• Identify the first slot of each run and the reservation
request that best matches the offer.
• Identify the provisional winners if such matches ex-
ist and remove the corresponding runs from the set
of available runs. A match exists if the run consists
of the same number of slots or is one slot longer than
requested and if the capacity offered is at least the
one required by the reservation request. For services
without a match, remove the last slot, add both the
shorter run and the last slot to the list of available
runs.
• Continue this process until only single slots are
available.
C. Final round. In this round we:
• Identify the packages for each client and if mul-
tiple packages exist determine the one which best
matches the request.
• Compute the cost for the winning package for each
client.
Figures 6(a)-(e) show several performance metrics in-
cluding the customer satisfaction index, the service mis-
match index, the auction success ratio, the spot oppor-
tunity index, the temporal fragmentation index, and the
capacity allocation index. The simulation covers 50 time
slots.
The 5% confidence intervals for the mean of all per-
formance metrics are computed for 25 batches each one
of 200 realization of each random variable. The simula-
tion times are 6.4 seconds for 2, 000 runs and 11.7 sec-
onds for 5, 000 runs. The confidence intervals are rather
tight; this indicates that the performance of the protocol
is relatively stable for the range of parameters explored
in this evaluation.
The auction success rate is high, typically above 80%.
The initial low auction success rate is an artifact of the
manner we conducted the simulation; we picked up ran-
domly the service start up time. The spot allocation
opportunity index is in turn correlated with the auction
success rate and shows that a significant fraction of the
capacity is available for spot allocation. This result is
correlated with the one in Figure 6(f) which shows that
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Figure 6: Proxy phase of an auction with 50 time slots. Indices of: (a) Customer satisfaction; (b) Service mismatch;
(c) Auction success; (d) Spot allocation opportunity; (e) Temporal fragmentation; (f) Capacity allocation.
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on average some 50% of the server capacity is not allo-
cated by the reservation system and so is available for
spot contention.
A reservation system covering 50% of the server ca-
pacity is probably the most significant result; it shows
that self-management based on auctions can drastically
improve server utilization. We live in a world of limited
resources and cloud over-provisioning is not sustainable
either economically or environmentally.
The service mismatch index is fairly high, typically
in the 50% range and it is above 60% in a few slots.
The customer satisfaction is correlated with the service
mismatch and typically is in the region of 50%. In a
realistic scenario, when coalitions maintain statistics re-
garding the services offered and avoid offering services
unlikely to be demanded by the cloud users, the service
mismatch would not affect the performance of the algo-
rithm. Temporal fragmentation, though rather low, is
undesirable. The overbidding factor 64 ± 2.93% is an-
other indication that the protocol needs to be fine tuned.
Self-organization cannot occur instantaneously in an
adaptive system and this simple observation has impor-
tant consequences. It is critical to give autonomous
cloud platforms, interconnected by a hierarchy of net-
works, the time to form coalitions in response to ser-
vices demanded. Thus, self-management requires an ef-
fective reservation system and our results indicate that
the reservation protocol is working well.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
Self-organization and self-management offer an appeal-
ing alternative to existing cloud resource management
policies; they have the potential to significantly al-
ter the cloud computing landscape. So far, pragmatic
means for the adoption of self-organization principles for
large-scale computing and communication systems have
eluded us. A main reasons for this state of affairs is that
self-management has to be coupled with some mecha-
nisms for cooperation; these mechanisms should allow
autonomous servers, to act in concert towards global sys-
tem goals. Cooperation means that individual systems
have to partially surrender their autonomy. Striking a
balance between autonomy and cooperation is a chal-
lenging task, it requires a fresh look at the mechanics of
self-organization and the practical means to achieve it.
Practical implementation of cloud self-organization is
challenging for several reasons including the absence of
a technically suitable definition of self-organization, a
definition that could hint to practical design principles
for self-organizing systems and quantitative evaluation
of the results. Computer clouds exhibit the essential as-
pects of complexity and it is inherently difficult to con-
trol complex systems.
We started our investigation with a realistic model
of the cloud infrastructure, the hierarchical organiza-
tion reported in [5] which seems inherently tied to hi-
erarchical control. First, we compared hierarchical con-
trol which based on monitoring with a market model
in which the servers of a WSC place bids for service
requests and found out that the latter is much more
effective than hierarchical control [22]. In the simple
market model the servers act individually, rather than
cooperating with each other, a fundamental aspect of
self-organization. But cooperation is clearly needed be-
cause individual servers may not be able to supply the
resources demanded by many data-intensive application.
Thus, we concluded that servers have to form coalitions
to offer larger pools of resources. At the same time,
it seemed obvious to us that complex applications with
multiple phases would require packages of resources of-
fered by different coalitions.
Algorithms for coalition formation based on combi-
natorial auctions are at the heart of the cloud ecosys-
tem we propose. The path we chose seems logical as
auctions have been successfully used for resource man-
agement in the past. Auctions do not require a model
of the system, while traditional resource management
strategies do. The auction-based protocol is scalable,
and the computations can be done efficiently, though
the computational algorithms involved are often fairly
complex.
The results reported in Section 6 indicate that the per-
formance of the protocol is relatively stable for the range
of parameters explored in our evaluation. The protocol
leads to a higher server utilization and it seems reason-
able to expect that a fine-tuned version of the protocol
could further improve this critical performance measure.
Two basic strategies for coalition formation are possi-
ble: (1) the one described in this paper, when coalitions
are formed using information from previous combinato-
rial auctions, before knowing what the actual user de-
mands are; (2) the more natural one, when coalitions are
formed in response to user demands and then combinato-
rial auctions are organized. The former strategy, though
simple and elegant, has two obvious drawbacks: (a) it
needs the past history thus, starting from some arbitrary
initial state may not work very well; (b) there may be
cases when coalitions formed based on past history are
not useful to any package and, at the same time, one or
more packages could benefit from the available resources
of the same type, but in coalitions of different sizes. The
latter strategy, creating coalitions in response to known
user requests is more complex. It requires a protocol to
inform supply agents of the atrributes of desirable coali-
tions, a protocol for individual agents to express their
willingness to join a particular coalition, and, finally, a
coalition formation algorithm. Once the coalitions are
formed the bidding for service packages can take place.
These two strategies can be combined, the latter used
during the initial stages, when the historic information is
either missing or incomplete, and the former used when
history data is available. The second drawback of the
strategy described in this paper can be attenuated by
allowing a second round of coalitions formation. In this
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second round the unsuccessful coalitions are disassem-
bled and new coalitions matching the needs of unsatis-
fied packages are formed. For example, if two coalitions
of size θ1 and θ2 were unsuccessful and a package P re-
quireing a coalition of size θ3 ≤ θ1 + θ2 was unsatisfied,
then a second round will guarantee that P is satisfied
and θ3 servers will be reserved, instead of being left idele
or offered to spot allocations.
Our future work will address this approach, as well
as, other problems revealed by this investigation, e.g.,
the effects of overbidding. Overbidding is the process
allowing a client to become a provisional winner of one
or more service slots and then, in the final round failing
to acquire some of them. This situation is critical for the
first slot of an auction as the next auctions could find
clients for these slots. A more difficult problem is the
temporal fragmentation which does not seem to have an
obvious solution.
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